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 1Patent damage awards are an area of great 
concern in the public debate regarding the patent 
system.  It is not only the horrendous numbers that 
are staggering to the newspaper reader.  It is also the 
large amount of uncertainty that patent infringement 
suits raise, leading to business-threatening situations.  
This paper explores the underlying reasons for the 
current patent damage framework and contrasts U.S. 
procedures with those in Germany.  Section A examines 
the general link between patent valuation and litigation 
damage awards.  Basic principles of patent damage 
law are explored in section B.  Section C examines the 
commonly applied, highly fact-intensive framework 
of a reasonable royalty analysis.  Section D looks at 
current trends within that framework. A comparative 
analysis between the findings and the more formalistic 
German patent damage regime is laid out in section E.
I. Patent Valuation and the Role of Litigation 
Damage Awards
 With a growing portion of today’s businesses 
having numerous intangible intellectual property 
(IP) assets, the importance of valuing these assets is 
increasing.  A price tag has to be attached to all forms 
of intellectual property for a number of reasons, 
including IP audits carried out for issuing corporate 
financial statements, public offers, mergers and 
acquisitions.  Valuation of IP is extremely difficult, 
because each piece of intellectual property is different 
from another, making the value inquiry highly 
contextual and fact-specific.2  It is apparent that 
important factors for a comprehensive value analysis are 
the likelihood of invalidity of the patent, the size of the 
1.  German Patent Attorney, European Trademark and Design 
Attorney, LL.M. candidate at American University Washington 
College of Law. Before entering the legal field, he studied electrical 
engineering, earning the degrees of Diplom-Ingenieur from 
University of Technology Munich and Master of Science from 
Stanford University. He received his legal education in Germany 
from FernUniversität Hagen, the German Patent and Trademark 
Office and the Federal Patent Court.
2.  See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 
F. Supp. 1116, 1119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (where the parties’ views 
regarding a reasonable royalty for a patent differed by a factor of 
30. This led the court to compile a list of 15 factual inquiries to be 
made when assessing the reasonableness of royalties). 
market for the protected product, and the availability of 
substitutes for the patented technology.
 As such a comprehensive analysis is not feasible 
for every instance where a price tag is required, basic 
valuation metrics have been developed that tie the value 
of the IP at hand to a more readily accessible number.  
For example, the “25% Rule” estimates the value of 
the patent to be 25% of the gross profits before taxes 
realized with the product embodied in the patent.3  
Another example is the “5% method”, which deems 
5% of the sum of all sales to be the value of the patent.4 
It is also possible to estimate the investment associated 
with the development of a design and use that number 
as the ceiling of the patent value.
 These and other simplified approaches not 
only inherently lack accuracy; they also fail to take 
into account the different motives for seeking patent 
protection and the “subjective” values associated 
therewith.  Some companies merely want to build up 
their patent rights in order to have leverage in cross-
licensing negotiations.  Other companies enforce their 
patents to protect their market share.  Non-practicing 
entities use patents as an asset only, and try to extract 
as much licensing value as possible.  For start-up 
companies, having a patented technology is often a 
huge sales argument and helps them to acquire venture 
capital.  A further complexity in the value inquiry arises 
from the territoriality of patents.  Patents for the same 
technology can have greatly diverging values in different 
jurisdictions, depending on the respective markets, legal 
frameworks, and enforcement mechanisms.
 In this thicket of value aspects and valuation 
methods, damage awards in patent infringement suits 
serve a strong notice function.  They demonstrate 
the value that can be extracted from a patent when 
used for its intended purpose to prevent the making, 
using, offering, or selling of a patented invention.5  As 
litigation awards set the frame for both the potential 
3.  See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
4.  See John S. Torkelson, Calculating Reasonable Royalty 
Damages for Infringement of Early-Stage Technology Patents, 4 
Sedona Conf. J. 47, 63 (2003).
5.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
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return a patentee can hope for and the risk an infringer 
is running by violating a patent right, the numbers 
emanating from patent infringement suits heavily 
influence license negotiations and patent valuation.6  
The RIM v. NTP saga is an illustrative example, 
showing that the fear of a large damage award raises the 
settlement value.7
II. Introduction to Damages in Patent 
Litigation
 The patent statute does not provide much 
guidance on how to calculate damages in patent 
infringement cases.8  The only relevant provision states 
that the infringer owes the patentee “damages adequate 
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event 
less than a reasonable royalty.”9  The Federal Circuit has 
also affirmed that a reasonable royalty is the absolute 
minimum a patentee can expect.10
 Besides providing the floor on damage 
awards, the reasonable royalty analysis is also the most 
commonly used method to calculate damages.11  This 
is because of the fact that the lost profits analysis, 
which is the alternative method of calculating damages, 
poses severe evidentiary problems for the patentee.  In 
accordance with the commonly applied four-factor 
test for calculating lost profits, the patentee has to 
establish “(1) demand for the patented product; (2) 
absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3) 
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the 
demand; and (4) the amount of profit it would have 
been made.”12  Where a non-practicing entity is the 
plaintiff, the lost profits method is by definition not 
6.  See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured 
Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 627, 642 (2010).
7.  David Weston & Dr. Kwanghui Lim, Intellectual 
Property Research Institute of Australia, BlackBerry, A 
Teaching Case for WIPO 6 (2008), available at http://www.
wipo.int/ export/sites/www/academy/en/ipacademies/educational_
materials/cs2_blackberry.pdf (facing the possibility of a $1 billion or 
more damage award led to a settlement of $612.5 million).
8.  See 35 U.S.C. §284 (2006).
9.  Id.
10.  See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A reasonable royalty is . . . merely the 
floor below which damages shall not fall.”) (citation omitted).
11.  See Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2010 Patent 
Litigation Study: The Continued Evolution of Patent 
Damages Law 12 chart 4 (2010). 
12.  See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)(“Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 
575 F.2d 1152, 197 U.S.P.Q. 726 (6th Cir.1978) articulated a 
four-factor test that has since been accepted as a useful, but non-
exclusive, way for a patentee to prove entitlement to lost profits 
damages.”).
applicable, because the plaintiff does not engage in its 
own production and can therefore not lose production 
profits.13
Accordingly, the reasonable royalty analysis 
is more of a last resort than a desired framework.14  
It has the inherent problem that it creates a circular 
relationship between damage awards and negotiated 
license agreements.15  The higher damage awards rise, 
the more licensing fees patentees will ask for, which 
in turn will be reflected in increased damage awards.  
While such a circle leads to the overcompensation 
of the patentee, it is logical that an opposite 
circular development could lead to a structural 
undercompensation of the patentee as well.
It is difficult to accept this and other 
imperfections of the reasonable royalty analysis, 
because the damage calculation is “an area of the 
law where reliability and precision are deemed 
paramount.”16  Reliability and precision are not only 
of crucial importance to justify potentially business-
destroying damage awards in the high-stakes field 
of patent litigation, but they are also essential to 
create a framework that delivers predictable damage 
awards.17  Only predictable results let businesses make 
sound decisions regarding their IP strategies and their 
research and development.18  Unfortunately however, 
attempts to make the reasonable royalty analysis as 
precise and comprehensive as possible have resulted in 
unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary damage awards, 
which is the opposite of the desired result.
III. The Reasonable Royalty Framework and its 
Impact on Predictability
There are multiple examples in patent litigation 
where the jury awarded damages that are more or 
less in the middle of the damages demanded by the 
13.  See Christopher B. Seaman, The Changing Patent 
Damages Regime: Reasonable Royalties After Lucent and 
Willful Infringement After Seagate 11(presented at the AIPLA 
2011 Annual Meeting, Oct. 20, 2011).
14.  See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 
F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 1978) (“When actual damages, e.g., 
lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent owner is entitled to a 
reasonable royalty.”).
15.  See Durie & Lemley, supra note 6, at 642.
16.  Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
17.  See Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable 
Royalty, 11 John Marshall Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 192, 193 (2011) 
(“Patents require proper protection through clear guidance from the 
legislature and predictable results from the judiciary.”).
18.  See id. (“Clear and predictable patent damages rules that 
lead to fair damages awards encourage subsequent inventors to 
improve upon existing inventions.”).
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patentee and the number deemed appropriate by the 
defendant.19  In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, 
Inc., the patentee, Lucent, had asked the jury for an 
award of $561.9 million, while the defendant Microsoft 
claimed that $6.5 million would be a reasonable 
royalty.20  The jury awarded $357.7 million to Lucent.21 
Does that mean that 50% of the damages amount 
asked for by the patentee is the best predictor of the 
damage award?22  Why are juries not able to assume a 
more differentiated view to calculate a truly reasonable 
royalty?
The underlying idea of the reasonable royalty 
analysis is to reconstruct a hypothetical negotiation 
scenario between the patentee and the infringer.23  The 
“willing licensor – willing licensee” approach tries to 
take into account the bargaining positions of the parties 
before the start of litigation, assuming the “asserted 
patent claims are valid and infringed.”24  The court, 
therefore, takes a mainly economic approach, looking 
at what business decisions the parties would have made 
at a past point in time.  An inquiry into the dynamics 
of a hypothetical negotiation is obviously very complex. 
In order to make the task reasonable, Georgia-Pacific 
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. proposed a non-exclusive 
15-factor test in order to guide the factual questions 
around the hypothetical negotiation.25 Those factors 
are:
1. The royalties received by the 
patentee for the licensing of the patent 
in suit, proving or tending to prove an 
established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the 
use of other patents comparable to the 
patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, 
as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as 
restricted or non-restricted in terms of 
territory or with respect to whom the 
manufactured product may be sold.
19.  See e.g. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1311 (resulting in a jury award 
of $388 million, after the plaintiff had asked for $565 million).
20.  See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
21.  See id. at 1324.
22.  See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1311.
23.  See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324 (looking at what the patentee 
“would have received through arms-length bargaining”).
24.  Id. at 1325.
25.  See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 
F.Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
4. The licensor’s established policy 
and marketing program to maintain 
his patent monopoly by not licensing 
others to use the invention or by 
granting licenses under special 
conditions designed to preserve that 
monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship 
between the licensor and licensee, such 
as, whether they are competitors in 
the same territory in the same line of 
business; or whether they are inventor 
and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented 
specialty in promoting sales of other 
products of the licensee; that existing 
value of the invention to the licensor as 
a generator of sales of his non-patented 
items; and the extent of such derivative 
or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the 
term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the 
product made under the patent; its 
commercial success; and its current 
popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the 
patent property over the old modes or 
devices, if any, that had been used for 
working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented 
invention; the character of the 
commercial embodiment of it as 
owned and produced by the licensor; 
and the benefits to those who have 
used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer 
has made use of the invention; and any 
evidence probative of the value of that 
use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the 
selling price that may be customary 
in the particular business or in 
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comparable businesses to allow for 
the use of the invention or analogous 
inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable 
profit that should be credited to the 
invention as distinguished from non-
patented elements, the manufacturing 
process, business risks, or significant 
features or improvements added by the 
infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified 
experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such 
as the patentee) and a licensee (such 
as the infringer) would have agreed 
upon (at the time the infringement 
began) if both had been reasonably 
and voluntarily trying to reach an 
agreement; that is, the amount which 
a prudent licensee- who desired, as 
a business proposition, to obtain 
a license to manufacture and sell 
a particular article embodying the 
patented invention- would have been 
willing to pay as a royalty and yet 
be able to make a reasonable profit 
and which amount would have been 
acceptable by a prudent patentee who 
was willing to grant a license.26
 Although this 15-factor test comes from a 
district court decision from 1970, it is still good law 
for any reasonable royalty analysis.  The Federal Circuit 
reiterated in Uniloc that the court “has sanctioned 
the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to frame the 
reasonable royalty inquiry.”27  Commentators have gone 
so far as to call the Georgia-Pacific factors the “gospel in 
the patent damages world.”28 
In addition to maintaining such a complex 
framework for the general inquiry, the Federal Circuit 
has expressly prohibited simplification through 
standardized methods, even in fact-specific cases.29  The 
damage calculation has to be tied to the facts of the case 
26.  Id.
27.  Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1317.
28.  See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 631.
29.  See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315.
in order to satisfy the burden of proving damages.30  
Consequently, a simplified approach, such as the “25 
percent rule of thumb,” is a “fundamentally flawed tool 
for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical 
negotiation.”31
The unpredictability of reasonable royalty 
awards stems from four factors.  First, the Georgia-
Pacific factors address such a wide range of issues that 
their application may have partly re-enforcing and 
partly contradicting effects.32  Valid reasons can be 
found for almost any sort of weighing of the factors.33  
The first two factors aim to establish a comparison to 
other licenses.34  Factors 3 and 7 look at the objective 
properties of the hypothetical license.35  Factors 4 
and 5 take into account the bargaining positions of 
the parties and the licensing policy of the patentee.36  
Factors 6, 8, 9 and 10 assess the commercial advantage 
of the patented technology and the additional effect 
such patented technology has on other products in the 
eye of the consumer.37  Factors 11 to 13 look at the 
extent of usage by the infringer and the impact on his 
profits.38  While factor 14 enforces the allowability of 
expert testimony, factor 15 sums up the hypothetical 
negotiation scenario framework.39  Juries will have a 
hard time applying 15 interrelated factors to the facts 
of the case and balance the respective outcomes.40  A 
predictable outcome is almost impossible.
Second, the judge can be equally lost in 
this framework as the gate-keeper of evidence. It is 
the court’s responsibility to “ensur[e] that all expert 
testimony must pertain to scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence 
. . . 702.”41  However, almost any piece of evidence 
or any piece of expert testimony may be argued to 
relate to one of the Georgia-Pacific factors, which cover 
30.  See id.
31.  Id.
32.  See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009)  (the factors “appear somewhat to 
offset one another”).
33.  See id. (“A jury could have reasonably concluded otherwise 
with several of the factors mentioned here.”).
34.  See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F.Supp. at 1120.
35.  See id.
36.  See id.
37.  See id.
38.  See id.
39.  See id.    
40.  See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 631 (“[A] non-
exclusive fifteen-factor test that requires balancing and consideration 
of the interactions between the factors is likely to give little or no 
practical guidance to a jury.”).
41.  Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315.
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both technical and business aspects of both parties.42  
A court will be hard-pressed to not allow a carefully 
outlined testimony, which ties the facts of the case 
to above factors, no matter how absurd the resulting 
damage figure may seem.  Also, the court has very few 
means of preventing the jury from hearing information 
that inevitably skews their judgment.43
Third, the 15-factor framework all but prevents 
a finding of clear error on a review level.44  Deference 
has been traditionally high in patent damage questions, 
because a “jury’s damage award must be upheld unless 
the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly 
not supported by the evidence, or based only on 
speculation or guesswork.”45  Recently, the Federal 
Circuit has looked more closely at the evidence 
supporting the damage award.  In Uniloc, the damage 
award was vacated because of the non-allowable 
application of the “25 percent rule of thumb.”46  In 
Lucent, the court held that the award of a lump sum 
payment was not supported by the evidence of running 
royalty licenses, which had been brought forward as 
comparable.47  Despite these attempts to require “sound 
economic proof of the nature of the market and likely 
outcomes” of the hypothetical negotiation, the level 
of deference will remain high in the framework of a 
15-factor test.48
Fourth, expert testimony is likely to prevail 
as the single most effective and jury-convincing 
piece of evidence.49  In the thicket of a 15-factor test 
with complex interrelations, the jury’s easiest way to 
deal with the balancing task at hand is to trust the 
convincing testimony of a qualified expert, which 
is explicitly called for by Georgia-Pacific factor 14.50  
This is all the more true, because the hypothetical 
negotiation scenario aims at including subjective 
factors, such as the parties bargaining power and their 
42.  See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
43.  See id. at 1320 (“The disclosure that a company has made 
$19 billion dollars in revenue from an infringing product cannot 
help but skew the damages horizon for the jury.”).
44. See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 628.
45.  Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 
2d 279, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Durie 
& Lemely, supra note 6, at 645 (providing statistical data on 
overturned cases).
46.  See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318.
47.  See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1325-32 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
48.  IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 
687, 689 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
49.  See Durie & Lemely, supra note 6, at 643. 
50.  See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. 
Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
general policies of striking licensing deals.51  In Fujifilm 
Corp. v. Benun, Fujifilm’s expert testified that a 40 cent 
royalty for disposable photo cameras would have been 
agreed upon because of Fujifilm’s strong bargaining 
position, which seems to have had a big impact on the 
jury justifying the damage award.52  Accordingly, the 
option of swaying the jury with well-targeted expert 
testimony will still be available to patentees.
IV. Current Emphasis within the Reasonable 
Royalty Framework
Although the Federal Circuit goes to great 
lengths to defend the comprehensive Georgia-Pacific 
framework, there seems to be a recent emphasis on 
some selected factors.53  Uniloc particularly stressed 
the importance of comparable licenses and the profit 
portion that is customarily attributed to comparable 
inventions.54  Lucent scrutinized the aspects of 
comparable licenses, the nature of the patented 
invention, the profit to be attributed to the invention, 
and the extent of infringer use, while merely brushing 
over the other factors.55   Accordingly, the main focus 
of recent decisions seems to be truly comparable 
licenses and a correct apportionment of the infringing 
component’s contribution to the entire product value.56
A. Comparable Licenses
Truly comparable licenses provide the best 
basis for a reasonable royalty analysis.  In other 
words, “an established royalty is usually the best 
measure of a ‘reasonable’ royalty for a given use of an 
invention.”57  However, in light of the recent decisions, 
the license argued to be comparable must be truly 
comparable.  Besides the rejection of the allegedly 
comparable licenses in Lucent, as discussed above, the 
51.  Id. (see, in particular, factors 4 and 5).
52.  See Fujifilm Corp. v. Benum, 605 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
53.  See Seaman, supra note 13.
54.  See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“In particular, factors 1 and 2 – looking 
at royalties paid or received in licenses for the patent in suit or in 
comparable licenses – and factor 12 – looking at the portion of 
profit that may be customarily allowed in the particular business 
for the use of the invention or similar inventions – remain valid 
and important factors in the determination of a reasonable royalty 
rate.”).
55.  See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1325-35 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (factors 2, 10, 11 and 13 were 
discussed in separate sections, while all other factors were lumped 
into an “other factors” category).
56.  See Seaman, supra note 13.
57.  IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 
687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Federal Circuit also objected to the reliance on “re-
bundling licenses” that “had no relation to the claimed 
invention.”58  In Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated 
Network Solutions, Inc., it was reiterated that lump sum 
licenses could only be compared to other lump sum 
licenses, unless there is evidence regarding a conversion 
between running royalties and lump sum payments.59  
Also, an averaging of previous licenses is inherently 
flawed and can therefore not be used as a calculation 
method.60  Under these circumstances, previous 
license agreements will probably only be deemed 
comparable in rare cases.  Examples of such cases are 
companies that have long-standing licensing policies 
and companies that are required to give reasonable and 
non-discriminatory licenses because of their contractual 
obligations, such as companies contributing to patent 
pools or licensing out standard-relevant patents.61
B. Apportionment and the Entire Market Rule
It is particularly difficult to calculate a 
reasonable royalty when no comparable licenses are 
available, the invention only affects a subportion 
of a larger product, and the infringer is a reputable 
company.62  The sales of a reputable company are 
at least partially attributable to their brand name, 
marketing, and customer services.  If only sales data for 
the product itself is available and the inventive feature is 
merely one of many features of the product, some form 
of analysis is necessary to apportion the contribution of 
the invention to the success of the product. 
Patentees commonly try to use the total 
sales revenue of the product as a royalty basis for 
the reasonable royalty analysis, because even a tiny 
royalty rate may then lead to a large damage award.63  
However, the patentee can only use this entire market 
value of the accused product “where the patented 
58.  ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 870 
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
59.  See Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks 
Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
60.  See id.
61.  See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 
297, 304 (3d Cir. 2007) (standard setting institutions require 
their members to grant fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) licensing terms in exchange for their technologies being 
considered in the standard setting process).
62.  See Seaman, supra note 13; see also Cornell Univ. v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
63.  See, e.g., Cornell Univ., 609 F.Supp.2d at 283 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“Cornell originally sought damages on the revenue 
from Hewlett-Packard’s entire server and workstation systems”, 
although the claimed invention only referred to “a component of a 
component within the processors used in Hewlett-Packard’s servers 
and workstations.”).
feature creates the basis for customer demand or 
substantially creates the value of the component 
parts.”64  The patentee is further required to present 
evidence, such as “economic evidence, marketing 
information, or customer surveys,” that this condition 
is fulfilled.65  In the Lucent case, Lucent was able to 
successfully argue the entire market rule because it 
was not possible to show that the patented feature, a 
calendar date picker, was the reason customers bought 
Microsoft Outlook.66  Accordingly, most cases involving 
complex systems require an apportionment analysis to 
reach a fair royalty base.67
The apportionment analysis is fundamentally 
an economic analysis.  The conceptual starting 
point is Georgia-Pacific factor 13, which is directed 
to the “portion of the realizable profit that should 
be credited to the invention as distinguished from 
non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, 
business risks, or significant features or improvements 
added by the infringer.”68  Being an economic analysis,  
apportionment allows all of the efforts undertaken 
by the infringer that add to the value of the product, 
but are not related to the patent, to be taken into 
account.69  These contributions include the infringer’s 
“own innovations, other investments in the product’s 
research, development, and design, and effective 
marketing, advertising, and sales strategies.”70  Also, the 
infringer’s brand name, reputation for reliability, and 
service should be taken into account.71  Furthermore, 
the apportionment analysis has to deal with the 
problem that synergies within a product are not 
attributable to patented or non-patent features alone, 
but to the combination of the two.72  The question 
is then how to distribute the synergies among the 
64.  Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65.  See Seaman, supra note 13.
66.  See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 
1301, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
67.  The court decisions are not free of contradictions 
on this point.  While Uniloc, Cornell and Red Hat require the 
determination of both a reasonable royalty base and a reasonable 
royalty rate, Lucent seems to suggest that it may be possible to use 
the entire market value as the royalty base when offsetting the same 
accordingly with a small royalty rate.
68.  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
69.  See Seaman, supra note 13.
70.  Id.
71.  See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 
279, 288 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
72.  See Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard & Mario 
A. Lopez, Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent Damages, 12 
Columbia Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 255, 262 (2011).
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features. 
As is evident, apportionment leaves ample 
room for argumentation over the correct royalty base.  
Equally, it is highly debatable which royalty rate the 
patentee and the infringer would have agreed upon 
in a hypothetical arms-length negotiation.  As the 
royalty award is the multiplication of the royalty base 
and the royalty rate, it is still subject to a great deal of 
uncertainty in the apportionment framework.
C. Example of Apportionment in Cornell University 
v. Hewlett-Packard Co.  
Cornell is a very illustrative case regarding 
apportionment.  The jury awarded damages of $184 
million to Cornell for Hewlett-Packard’s infringement 
of a Cornell patent.73  Federal Circuit Judge Randal 
R. Rader, sitting in the district court by designation, 
overruled the jury award on a judgment as a matter 
of law and lowered the award to $53 million.74  The 
decision was based on a lack of apportionment in 
the patentee’s evidence for the damage calculation 
presented to the jury.75
The patent in this case was directed to “a 
method for instruction issuance within a computer 
processor,” wherein this method affected “one 
component of the instruction reorder buffer (IRB), 
itself a part of a computer processor.”76  The processor 
is in turn part of a CPU module, which yields a CPU 
brick when combined with “a temperature controlling 
thermal solution, external cache memory, and a power 
converter.”77  “A set of CPU bricks is then incorporated 
into a cell board, and that cell board is finally inserted 
into a server.”78  The entire server revenue was initially 
used for Cornell’s damage calculation.79  After being 
instructed that such an approach reflected a reliance 
on the entire market rule that was inadmissible in 
the absence of appropriate proof, Cornell based its 
calculations on the CPU bricks, which led to a royalty 
base of $23 billion.80  The jury used this calculation for 
the damage award of $184 million. 
The court’s reduction of the damage award was 
based on the reduction of the royalty base.  According 
to the court, the starting point for the royalty base 
73.  See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
74.  See id. at 293.
75.  See id. at 290.
76.  Id. at 283.
77.  Id.
78.  Id.
79.  See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
80.  See id. at 284.
should be the “smallest salable infringing unit with 
close relation to the claimed invention – namely the 
processor itself.”81  Even if that unit is not actually sold, 
an apportionment is inevitable, no matter if it has to 
be based on assumptions.82  Seeing Hewlett-Packard’s 
hypothetical processor revenue calculation to be the 
only reliable evidence, the court reduced the royalty 
base to $6.7 billion, leading to a damage award of $53 
million.83
 The outcome of this case is somewhat 
unsatisfying, because the court did not think the 
apportionment framework through to the end.  The 
decision gives no analysis how much the patented 
method contributes to the instruction reorder buffer, 
and how much the instruction reorder buffer actually 
contributes to the processor.  It does not ask what the 
economic relevance of these contributions is.  The 
opinion gives the impression that the court was simply 
content with reducing the damage award, which came 
out low due to a very low royalty rate of 0.8%, which 
the court left untouched.  It is questionable if it makes 
sense to look at the royalty base and the royalty rate 
independently.84
V. Damage Calculations in Germany
The damage calculation framework employed 
in the US is highly fact-intensive and aims at taking 
into account all factors of the case. It is, however, 
also possible that a legal system does not aim for such 
factual completeness, but values procedural simplicity 
and predictability. One example for such a legal system 
is Germany, where the field of damage calculations is 
mostly free of controversy.  This is illustrated by the fact 
that Schulte, the most renowned and ubiquitously used 
commentary regarding German patent law, dedicates a 
mere 11 out of almost 1,600 total pages to the issue of 
damage calculation.85
Infringement damages may be calculated 
according to one of three methods: lost profits of 
the patentee, profits of the infringer, or a reasonable 
royalty analysis.86  The reasonable royalty analysis 
poses the question what reasonable parties would have 
agreed upon.87  It therefore explicitly disregards the 
81.  Id. at 288.
82.  See id. at 290.
83.  See id. at 292.
84.  See Bailey, supra note 72, at 257-59.
85.  See Rainer Schulte, Patentgesetz mit EPÜ [Patent 
Law with EPC] 1431-42 (2008).
86.  See id. at 1432.
87.  See id. at 1436.
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particular parties’ bargaining positions and the issue if 
the patentee would have granted a license in the first 
place.  Moreover, it is assumed that the parties would 
have anticipated the infringement as it is taking place.88  
Accordingly, the analysis is carried out completely 
ex-post and does not have any ex-ante element of a 
hypothetical negotiation between the parties before the 
infringement.
The calculation of a reasonable royalty in 
Germany is also a combination of the royalty basis 
and the royalty rate.89  The royalty basis is the sales 
value of the product embodying the invention.90  In 
case an inventive component is part of a larger system, 
it is to be determined if there is a market for the 
inventive component itself: if yes, the sales value of the 
component should serve as the royalty basis; if not, 
the sales value of the whole system or an estimated 
sales value of the component can serve as the royalty 
basis.91  Depending on the component or the system 
being used as the royalty basis, different royalty rates 
have to be used in order to reach equitable results.92  
In this way, German damage law follows an economic 
apportionment inquiry when a separately sellable 
product embodies the invention. When the inventive 
component is part of a larger system, the inventive 
contribution to the larger system is estimated, which 
commonly leads to a relative value analysis of the 
individual components.  A comprehensive economic 
apportionment inquiry, as carried out in the United 
States and described above, does not take place. 
The royalty rate is a rate that reasonable 
parties would have agreed to, when knowing about 
the extension of the infringing use of the invention.93  
Common industry standards are the reference, which 
may be slightly adapted according to an equity analysis 
regarding the facts of the case.94  However, no punitive 
raising of the royalty rate because of the infringer’s 
illegal activity is admissible under German law.95  
Depending on the industry, royalty rates between 0.2% 
and 6% are standard in Germany, with the chemical 
industry being more towards the lower end, the 
mechanical industry being closer to the higher end, and 
the pharmaceutical and electrical industries falling in 
88.  See id.
89.  See id. at 1437.
90.  See id.
91.   See Schulte, supra note 85, at 1431-42 (2008).
92.  See id.
93.  See id. at 1438.
94.  See id.
95.  See id.
between.96
If we applied the German reasonable royalty 
framework to the facts in Cornell, the resulting damage 
award would have been lower under the additional 
assumptions given below.  Cornell established that the 
processor was the smallest sellable unit that embodies 
the patented method.97  The processor would therefore 
also be the starting point for the royalty base in 
Germany.  However, the instruction reorder buffer is 
only one component of the processor.  According to 
standard processor architecture, other components, 
such as the arithmetic logic unit and the control logic, 
are seen as the main components.98  Therefore, it is 
likely that the instruction reorder buffer would only be 
attributed a small share of the value of the processor.  
For the hypothetical calculation, it is assumed that 
this share would be 10%.  A typical royalty rate for 
electronic components in Germany would be 2%.99  
Accordingly, 0.2% of the processor revenue would 
be the reasonable royalty, which would amount to 
$13 million.  This would be a quarter of the damages 
awarded in Cornell by the District Court.100  This 
reflects the perception that damage rewards are lower in 
Germany.
As this example shows, many facts of the 
case are disregarded for the damage calculation in 
Germany. The analysis essentially boils down to two 
questions: which portion of the value of the sellable 
product is attributed to the patented component and 
what is an industry-specific royalty rate? Importantly, 
the bargaining positions of the parties as well as their 
inclinations to license their technologies are not 
taken into account. By disregarding these company-
specific, subjective factors, the analysis becomes more 
predictable. In this way, the framework also prevents 
very large damage awards, although they could be 
justified by a party’s market position in a particular 
case. It can be concluded that the reflection of a party’s 
subjective value of the patent in the damage award 
is sacrificed for a rather formalistic and predictable 
damage calculation procedure.        
  
96.  License/Sales, Copat.de, http://www.copat.de/mn_
verwert_lizenz.htm (GER) (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
97.  See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp.2d 
279, 283 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
98.  CPU-Central Processing Unit, Webopedia, http://www.
webopedia.com/TERM/C/CPU.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
99.  License/Sales, Copat.de, http://www.copat.de/mn_
verwert_lizenz.htm (GER) (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
100.  See Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 292.
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VI. Conclusion 
German and U.S. law approach the issue of 
patent litigation damages in fundamentally different 
ways.  German law carries out an ex-post analysis of the 
infringement actions, attributing a reasonable royalty 
to a portion of the sales that are deemed to relate to 
the inventive component of a product.  In contrast, 
US law uses the ex-ante framework of a hypothetical 
negotiation between a willing licensee and a willing 
licensor.  The basic inquiry is which reasonable royalty 
the parties would have agreed upon, given their 
bargaining position before the infringement took place.  
As this comprehensive analysis takes into account 
all technical and business aspects of the hypothetical 
license, a great deal of uncertainty remains as to the 
outcome of the damage awards.  The courts are trying 
to bring more structure to this analysis by requiring 
the patentees to bring forward evidence which portion 
of their profits is actually attributable to the invention.  
This apportionment framework has brought patent 
damages down and increased legal certainty to some 
extent.  However, a level of legal certainty comparable 
to Germany will not be achievable with the given 
framework of a hypothetical negotiation.  On the 
other hand, only such a framework allows a patentee to 
recover damages that reflect his individual position, as 
is generally desired by awarding the monopoly right of 
a patent. 
